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Abstract
We describe two procedures that assist insurance firms in determining sharehold-
ers’ risk tolerance thresholds and in using such thresholds within the decision-
making process. The first procedure is based on parsimonious measures of the
risk/return tradeoff such as the Sharpe Ratio; the second procedure makes a
direct use of expected utility theory.
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1. Introduction
Following the standards recently laid down by the Italian supervi-
sory body for insurance companies (ISVAP), the Board of Directors is
responsible for the risk management system. Among other things, this
implies that it must determine risk tolerance thresholds and ensure that
top-level executives take on risk exposures attuned to those thresholds.
Under the assumption of full alignment of Board’s and shareholders’
interests, we describe two possible procedures that help determining
shareholders’ risk tolerance thresholds and aid executives in undertak-
ing new risky projects.
Section 2 describes the notation employed. Section 3 explains the
first procedure for eliciting shareholders’ attitude towards risk. Section
4 gives the details of the second procedure for educing risk tolerance
levels. Section 5 concludes.
2. Notation
We denote with A the market value of an insurance firm’s assets
and with L the market value of its liabilities. L comprises the value
of senior debt and the reserves set aside to shield the expected losses
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from the insurance business. The firm’s total equity capital includes
common stock and hybrid/junior debt. Its future value is given by the
difference A˜ − L˜. The standard deviation of A˜ − L˜ is s and quantifies
equity capital’s risk.
The absorbed equity capital is denoted by K (A,L, s). It is the
sum of the minimum required capital and of the additional solvency
capital. Y is the residual equity capital after absorption, hence Y =
A−K (A,L, s)−L. We denote with R˜ the annual earnings after interests
and taxes (EAIT), with R the expected EAIT, E
(
R˜
)
, and with g the
earnings’ annual growth rate.
The cost of equity capital per annum is denoted with k, the market
price of common stock with p, and the payout ratio based on the firm’s
dividend policy with π.
2.1. The interplay between s (quantity of risk) and K (A,L, s)
(absorbed capital)
The volatility s is conditional upon the current market values of
assets and liabilities:
s =
(
var
(
A˜− L˜ |A,L
)) 1
2
.
If the internal risk management model is based on Value at Risk (VaR),
we can reasonably assume that the absorbed capital K (A,L, s) conforms
to the following definition:
K (A,L, s) = minimum required capital + additional solvency capital
= max (minimum required capital, VaR1−α) ,
where VaR1−α is the (potential) decrease of future equity capital that
solves the equation
Pr
(
A˜− L˜ ≥ A− L−VaR1−α | A,L
)
= 1− α,
with α small and selected by the firm’s risk management taskforce(1). We
denote with Pr ( · | A,L) the objective probability measure conditional
upon the current market values of assets and liabilities.
(1)VaR is a maximum loss measure widely applied in finance for quantitative
risk management for many types of risk (for example, see Jorion (2005)).
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2.2. The balance sheet
The balance sheet in the absence and in the presence of a new risky
project is:
Capital structure without the project Capital structure with the project
Y Y′
A K (A,L, s) A′ K (A′, L′, s′)
L L′
3. The Sharpe ratio approach for measuring the attitude
towards risk
The first procedure for eliciting shareholders’ attitude towards risk
employs the Sharpe ratio to put a figure on the incentive implicit in the
decision of undertaking a given benchmark project. We first derive the
implied expected EAIT and then we quantify shareholders’ risk appetite
by means of the implied Sharpe ratio.
The cost of equity capital can be computed from Gordon’s Growth
Model(2) adjusted for the efficiency impact of changes in the absorption
ratio. Accordingly, firm’s share price is
p′ =
πθ′R̂′/N ′
k′ − ĝ′ ,
where the change in the absorption ratio is denoted by
θ′ =
(
K (A,L, s)
K (A′, L′, s′)
A′ − L′
A− L
)
,
N ′ is the number of shares, R̂′ and ĝ′ are the levels of R′ and g′ as fore-
casted by internal and external experts. The levels of K (A′, L′, s′) and
p′ embed the final absorption of equity capital and the market reaction
due to a possible adjustment of the credit rating assigned by a rating
agency to the insurance firm after the project has been undertaken.
(2)Brealy and Myers (2003) offer a thorough review of the techniques for corpo-
rate security valuation. Among these, the Gordon’s Formula stands out for its
neat and parsimonious blend of the pricing primitives.
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Shareholders′ stimulus to go for the project is strong enough if the
implied expectation for its EAIT, R′∗, is sufficiently high:
πθ′R′∗
Y ′ + K (A′, L′, s′)
= πθ′
R′∗
A′ − L′︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorption-
adjusted
income return
≥ k′︸︷︷︸
cost ofequity
− ĝ′︸︷︷︸
return from
growth
The minimum expected EAIT implicit in the undertaken project is
R′∗min =
k′ − g′
πθ′
(A′ − L′) .
The expected implied total return,
πθ′R′∗
A′ − L′ + ĝ
′,
can be expressed as the sum of the risk-free rate (rf ) and of the per-
centage premium (r′∗) that, by embarking on the project, shareholders
subjectively believe to collect as a compensation for the new level of
risk (s′):
πθ′R′∗
Y ′ + K (A′, L′, s′)
+ ĝ′ = rf + r′∗.
Notice that if θ is smaller than 1, the risk entailed by the project causes
a greater absorption of equity capital and, hence, a penalty for the new
expected return (‘leverage effect’). The Sharpe Ratio is
S′∗ =
r′∗
s′
,
so that the implicit percentage risk premium can be expressed as follows:
r′∗ = S′∗︸︷︷︸
subjective assessment
of the reward per unit risk
× s′︸︷︷︸
quantity of risk
The implied Sharpe ratio S′∗ quantifies the implied level of risk appetite
as it is a neat measure of the risk tolerance implicit in accepting the
risk entailed by the new project. Shareholders accept the new project,
thus displaying confidence in receiving a total premium high enough to
compensate for the new risk level s′.
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3.1. A criterion for decision making
S′∗ can be used as a criterion for future investment opportunities.
Suppose shareholders have to decide whether or not to invest in a novel
project (the items related to the novel project will be marked with ′′).
Shareholders are strongly egged on accepting the novel project if the
estimated risk appetite S′∗ is high enough to readily digest the novel
quantity of risk.
rf +
θ′′
θ′︸︷︷︸
novel adjustment
for absorption
× S′∗︸︷︷︸
implied risk
appetite
× s′′︸︷︷︸
novel quantity
of risk
>
∗
k︸︷︷︸
current cost
of equity capital
⇓
accept the new project
3.2. Example
We exemplify the Sharpe ratio approach by focusing on a firm
monitored at three successive dates. The firm’s original capital structure
is observed at date 0. Shareholders decide to undertake a project at
date 1 and the implied risk appetite is educed from the effects of such
a decision. The implied risk appetite is used to assess a prospective
project at date 2.
The original capital structure is carachterized by a market value
of assets equal to 100 and by a a market value of equity capital equal
to 50.
Capital structure at date 0
A = 100 Y + K (A,L, s) = 50
L = 50
Equity capital is divided into N = 100 shares whose price is p =
50/100 = 0.5. The firm’s dividend policy is set by the payout ratio
π = 0.4. Analysts appraise firm’s growth, its equity capital’s risk, and
its expected EAIT at gˆ = 3%, s = 15%, and Rˆ = 10, respectively. It
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follows that the cost of equity capital is 11:
k = 11% ⇐⇒ 100− 50
100
= p =
π︷︸︸︷
0,40 (
R̂︷︸︸︷
10 )/100
k − 0,03︸︷︷︸
ĝ
.
The equity capital that the firm is obliged to take aside for solvency
issues is
K (100, 50, 0,15) = 11,665.
Such a computation for the absorbed capital comes from the following
assumption(3): conditionally upon the current market values A and L,
A˜−L˜ is distributed as a Gamma random variable with mean(4) A−L and
standard deviation s (A− L). The non-negative support of the Gamma
random variable fits shareholders’ limited liability. The original situation
can be abridged in the following table.
(3)The gamma distribution is defined for x > 0, a > 0, b > 0, by the integral
F (x; a, b) =
1
baΓ (a)
∫ x
0
ua−1e−
u
b du
where Γ (t) =
∫∞
0
e−uut−1du is the Gamma function. The parameters a and b
are called the shape parameter and scale parameter, respectively. The mean of
this distribution is ab and the variance is ab2. In our context,
a =
1
s2
, b = As2 − Ls2.
(4)A refined assumption for the mean would be
(
E
(
A˜ − L˜ − (A − L) |A,L
))
= (A − L) k.
However, the more involved nature of the ensuing calculations would jeopardize
example’s fluency.
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Detailed capital structure at date 0 (k = 11%)
Y = 38,335
A = 100 K (100, 50, 0,15) = 11,665
L = 50
At date 1, shareholders undertake a new benchmark project that has the
following impact on the market-consensus levels of firm’s fundamentals:
gˆ′ = 4%, Rˆ′= 10, s′ = 20%. The project improves firm’s growth but
makes equity more risky. The new capital for project’s commencement
is raised via a seasoned equity offering (30 new shares are issued) and
the market value of equity capital swells up to 70 (the market believes
that the net present value of the new benchmark project is 20). The new
benchmark project does not involve amendments in the firm’s liabilities,
whose market value remains constant at 50 as more equity capital is set
aside to handle the changes in the firm’s risk profile. The resulting cost
of equity capital is
k = 8,375% ⇐⇒ 120− 50
100 + 30
= p′
=
π︷︸︸︷
0,40
(
K (100, 50, 0,15)
K (120, 50, 0,20)
70
50
) Rˆ′︷︸︸︷
10 (100 + 30)
k′ − 0,04︸︷︷︸
gˆ′
,
where the change in the absorption ratio is
K (100, 50, 0,15)
K (120, 50, 0,20)
70
50
= 0,765 6.
The following table depicts the firm’s balance-sheet outcome.
Detailed capital structure at date 1 (k′ = 8,375%)
Y ′ = 48,67
A′ = 100 + 20 K (120, 50, 0.20) = 21,33
L′ = 50
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If the risk free rate is rf = 5%, then the implied Sharpe ratio is
S′∗ =
1
0,20︸︷︷︸
s′


π︷︸︸︷
0,40
change in the
absorption ratio︷ ︸︸ ︷
0,765 6
R′∗min︷︸︸︷
10
70︸︷︷︸
A′−L′
+ 0,04︸︷︷︸
gˆ′
− 0,05︸︷︷︸
rf


= 0,168 74.
Shareholders accept the new project, thus exhibiting confidence in re-
ceiving a premium per unit risk of at least 0,16874. This completes the
calibration of shareholders’ risk attitude.
At date 2, shareholders face a novel project that will push up equity
capital’s risk to 30. Given the implied level of their risk tolerance,
shareholders should undertake the project if its implied return on equity
capital, (
.05 +
θ′′
θ′
0,16874 (.30)
)
= 9,608%
is greater than firm’s current cost of equity capital. The adjustment
in absorption rate is conservatively set to account for a project’s zero
impact on the market values of firm’s securities:
θ′′
θ′
=
K (120, 50, 0,30)
K (120, 50, 0,20)
K (100, 50, 0,15)
K (120, 50, 0,20)
= 0,91017.
4. The expected utility approach for eliciting the level of
risk tolerance
The second procedure for bringing forth the representative share-
holder’s tolerance towards risk employs the Optimality Condition(5) for
shareholder’s portfolio holdings and the market value of firm’s equity
capital.
(5)Cochrane (2001) is one of the classic references to see how such first order
conditions emerge in the context of consumption-based model.
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The representative shareholder makes the rational decision of retain-
ing full controll of firm’s equity capital through time. Optimality of her
portfolio decisions implies that she is indifferent between (a) keeping
all the firm’s shares and (b) divesting ε units of them for immediate
consumption:
uc (c) · ε (A− L)−
∞∑
h=1
E
[
βhuc (c˜h) · επR˜h | c,R
]
= 0
(Optimality Condition),
where we assume that her preferences are represented by time-additive
expected utility, β is her intertemporal discount rate, u (·) is the concave
utility she derives from yearly consumption, ux (x) is u′s first derivative,
and c (c˜h) stands for yearly current (date-h) consumption. It follows
that her subjective assessment of the equity capital value must be in
line with the market-consensus one:
∞∑
h=1
E
[
βh
(
uc (c˜h)
uc (c)
)
· πR˜h | c,R
]
= A− L,
where βh
(
uc(c˜h)
uc(c)
)
is shareholder’s intertemporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution between current consumption and date-h consumption. If u (·)
takes the form of power utility,
u (x) =
x1−γ − 1
1− γ 1{x>0}, γ ≤ 0, limγ→1u (x) = ln (x) ,
then the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is
−xuxx (x)
ux (x)
= γ.
As the following figure highlights, the relative risk aversion is related to
the curvature of the utility from yearly consumption.
Once the risk aversion coefficient γ has been estimated from past
equity prices via the Optimality Condition, the merits of a new project
can be assessed on the basis of the welfare improvements induced by
project’s impact on shareholder’s consumption stream and on the EAIT
stream.
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Fig. 1. γ = 0 (risk neutrality, black), γ = 1 (log utility, red), γ = 2 (green).
4.1. Shareholder’s subjective valuation of equity capital in
closed form
Suppose that R˜h and c˜h are log-normally distributed with mean
and variance as follows:
µR˜h = R(1 + gR)
h, µc˜h = W (1 + gc)
h,
σ2
R˜h
= hσ2R, σ
2
c˜h
= hσ2c .
Their correlation is conveniently stated after a log transformation:
ρ = corr
(
ln R˜h, ln c˜h
)
.
Straightforward computations lead to the following structure for share-
holder’s subjective assessment of the equity capital value:
∞∑
h=1
βhE
[
e−γ(ln c˜h−ln c)+ln R˜hπ | c,R
]
= πR
∞∑
h=1
βh
[
(1 + gR)
(1 + gc)
γ
]h(
hσ2c
R2(1 + gc)2h
+ 1
) 1
2 (γ+γ2)
× exp

−γρ

 ln
(
hσ2R
R2(1+gR)2h
+ 1
)
×
ln
(
hσ2c
R2(1+gc)2h
+ 1
)


1
2

 .
The infinite sum can be proved to converge for β(1+gR)(1+gc)γ < 1. Notice
that it does not depend on the level of current consumption. This is
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not surprising since what matters for shareholder’s value assessment is
consumption’s rate of substitution rather than consumption’s levels.
4.2. Example
We exemplify the expected utility approach by focusing on two
successive dates. The market value of firm’s equity capital is observed
at date 0 and employed to calibrate the risk aversion parameter γ. The
implied risk appetite is used to assess a prospective project at date 1.
The intertemporal discount rate is fixed at β = 0.9. The firm’s payout
ratio is π = 40%.
At date 0, the outlook for shareholder’s consumption stream and
for firm’s cashflows is as follows:
R = 10 gR = 4% gc = 1%
σ2R = 10% σ
2
c = 1% ρ = 30%
These parameter values grant infinite sum’s convergence for γ ≥ 0.
Given such an outlook for consumption and cashflows, the following ta-
ble reports the risk aversion levels implied by several market values of
equity capital (centered around 50). The table visualizes the intuitive
inverse relationship between risk aversion levels and market prices (co-
eteris paribus, the more conservative is the shareholder, the lower is her
subjective assessment of the equity capital value).
equity capital’s market value (A − L) implied relative risk aversion (γ)
48 1,3967
49 1,2387
50 1,0867
51 0,94055
52 0,79977
At date 1, a prospective project is considered. If undertaken, it would
change the outlook as follows:
R = 10 gR = 5% gc = 1,25%
σ2R = 15% σ
2
c = 1,25% ρ = 30%
Given γ = 1,0867, these parameter values imply convergence of the infi-
nite sum. Shareholder’s subjective assessment of the equity capital value
with the project in place would be 55,096. Any contemporaneous mar-
ket value below that figure would strongly motivate the representative
shareholder to press for such a project.
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5. Conclusions
We have examined two techniques whose objective is to provide
support to insurance companies in calibrating shareholders’ risk appetite
levels and in employing the calibrated levels within the decision-making
process. The first technique is based on a mean-variance performance
gauge like the Sharpe Ratio, whereas the second technique takes direct
advantage of expected utility theory.
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